Achieving Outerspace Security Effectiveness

Outer space is a fundamental resource to all of us regardless of whether our origin is from developing or already developed nations. The concept of outer space must be kept free from attack with the holistic view of humankind. Outer space security is founded on the Transparency and Confidence- Building Measures (TCBMs). These are policies and guidelines that are geared towards ensuring space safety and security at all levels in all nations. They eradicate possible threats and conquering challenges to peace and security, prevention of confrontation amongst military, as well as facilitating the administration of situations that could in one way or the other lead to global nervousness. In reference to the UNIDIR conferences, outer space security has not been an issue without constraints that hamper creation of peaceful uses of outer space (Baker, p. 46)

The world communities have become more dependent on satellite services and the global society is sensitive that outer space activities are very critical and vital. Nevertheless, they are also very exposed to accidents and equipment failures, as recent year’s events and incidences have shown. Myriad of problems are associated in the usage of the outer space. The biggest drawback in building future space security is getting the comprehension of the today’s threats and where the technology will be in a not-too –distant future. One problem discussed at length in the UNDIR conference was the available and emerging weapons technology, which brought the concept of space weapons. These comprised of earth–to-space, space -to-space and space–to-earth weapons. In the presentation, it was also pointed out that, how each of the space weapons achieved its desired effects was a threat. The problem with the word space weapons was found to have an ambiguous meaning, as there was no homogenous family of systems. Space weapons systems are costly and founded on generic technology, which poses problems in the future. Other problems are the overpopulation in the space environment where more than 3000 satellites are in population. Immobile devices and the immeasurable pieces of space debris pose mounting dangers to the global community (Burke, p. 87).

Launching of orbit objects is also another aspect that can make satellite network even more exposed and more prone to collapse. The collapse would affect all nations without distinction of those that have and those that do not have the technological capacity to initiate weapons in the orbit. As one scientist, Carl Sagan argued, the global community would face a total global blackout. The differing opinions and lack of cooperation between the countries that are able to launch weapons in the orbit and those that do not have the capacity to do so is another problem influencing on the outer space security. For those countries that do not have, the power to launch weapons in orbit, they believe that outer space should be used exclusively for satellites that provide communications and information as well as other services. To those that are able to develop and deploy weapons, outer space is an atmosphere with potential competition for its use.

Another policy is that, space technology should play a very critical and chief role in the developing and implementing outer space sustainable development. Equal and unbiased access to outer space conditions for all states regardless of the nature and level of scientific and economic expansion is another policy that could address threats to outer space security. Outer space should be non-appropriated by claim of independence, utilization, and occupations. Besides, outer space should not be used for military endeavors and military oriented activities but firmly for the enhancement of living conditions and peace on the planet.

Regional cooperation should be taken into consideration as a policy that would ensure outer space security. International collaboration in space activities must be developed in order to promote all aspects of the nonviolent utilization of outer space and to improve todays and prospective activities in the area of outer space with a view to contributing to global economic, social and sustainable development most for especially developing countries (Bunn and John, p. 39).

Another policy towards streamlining in the peaceful usage of outer space is building and developing concrete bilateral and multilateral ties among those parties interested at both the regional and interregional levels (Wilson, p. 70). The potential, importance and impact of the usage of space activities have triggered the awareness amongst all nations. This means that, a policy addressing forums in which space-related issues are addressed should be enhanced and reinforced in order to ensure that all nations take part in them on the premises of equality (Garwin, p. 56).

Usage of outer space leads to activities that have myriad of benefits. These benefits should be evenly distributed amongst all the nations globally. To do this, inclusive development should be prioritized in the searching and use of outer space with due respect to the outer space atmosphere. All states should be given equal access to outer space activities whilst taking into consideration the importance of humankind (Lupton, p. 88). Access and use of outer space activities by states should not be a competitive condition amongst space faring nations and those that are not space faring but that one of a cooperative undertaking where benefits are shared among the global community as a whole.

Outer space environment should be maintained for safety and peaceful purposes not for destructive reasons. This can be achieved through collaboration in science and technology and discovery activities as well as ensuring presence of human beings in the space (Smith, p. 55). In pursuit of deriving gains from outer space activities, all nations should hold fast the already existing legal framework governing outer space activities and implement the guidelines designed to enhance and foster behavior in outer space. Though existing international framework can be used to address the use of outer space, the laws should be reviewed and others developed in order to prevent the placement of weapons in the outer space environment and address the issues of the space environment (Garwin, p. 15).

There is a gap between the existing space law and the non-militarization of the outer space. This gap should be addressed by stating and stipulating clearly these laws. Special binding and obligatory international legal instrument should be put in place and elaborated in order to address and ensure outer space is used in a peaceful manner and to prevent any military activities. The committee attending the UNIDIR conferences should enhance and promote teamwork and harmonization with other bodies of the United Nations system in order to ensure space activities are done peacefully and to avert the placement of weapons in the outer space. The draft treaty presented by China and the Russian Federation against placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat of outer space objects should be emphasized as this would prevent arms contest in outer space.

The committees in UNIDIR conferences should facilitate the operation of the draft code which include the Transparency and Confidence- Building Measures (TCBMs) that would address safety and security in outer space given direction by the principle of access to space objects in orbit with due consideration for the lawful security and defense interests of states (Primack 18). The execution of TCBMs should take place in such an approach as to ensure the right of each state to unfinished security. This would guarantee that no individual state or states obtain advantages over others at any stage of the confidence- building process. Equitable geographical distribution of resolutions should be taken into account and addressed by a joint work of governmental experts in order to undertake exploration studies on outer space TCBMs. In fact, TCBMs in the outer space activities, in view of the growing dependence of all countries in the world on the outcome of such activities, are important components of confidence-building measures. These include measures on land, at sea and in the air to achieve similar objectives in all the states. For instance, the number of events in the course of space activities, such as those of the Russian and American spacecraft on 10 February 2009 and the near collision of a number of space objects and space debris would be averted by use of confidence building measures. In line with this, the working group on the long-term sustainability of the outer space activities of the Scientific and Technical subcommittee should synchronize all its activities with those ones of the group of governmental experts pertinent to the Working Group’s authorization on voluntary measures for safety and sustainability of space activities (Laura and Wright, p. 33). Besides, there should be measures that are aimed at enhancing transparency of the outer space programs, expanding the information obtainable from the outer space objects in orbit, and directing rules of conduct for outer space activities. There should be measures through exchange of information, familiarization visits, consultations and workshops.

There should be exchange of information on the main directions of the nation’s policies purely on outer space activities, outer space research and use of programs, parameters of outer space objects in the orbit, and dangerous situations in outer space forecast. Notification should be done on the planned launches of spacecraft, programmed spacecraft drills, which should to a large extent result in dangerous nearness to spacecraft of other nations, and on return of a spacecraft with nuclear power source on board in the events of break down and threat that the radioactive materials will fall back to earth.

It is without notice that comprehensive consultation should be done in order to put it clearly the information on outer space examination and use of programs. This is especially where ambiguity exists between the military law and the law of lands as well as on other issues of concern and on how the implementation of agreed transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) in outer space activities. The issue is how to implement the TCBMs in order to ensure that the outer space is used just for peaceful purposes. This brings clear the essence of consulting for expert judgment in order to form a strong framework and structure for implementing the TCBMs without compromising the laws of different organizations (Belote, p. 23).

Workshops should comprise of not only scientists and diplomats but also military and technical experts, as this would form a clear and strong directive addressing the dangers of militarization of outer space. Establishing a United Nations group of governmental experts with the appropriate go-ahead to handle outer space activities would also be of useful impact to prevent militarization of outer space

Many of the countries are for the Transparency and Confidence Building Measures and others do not like to abide to the stipulations of the policies. There is a clear distinction between TCBMs and verification measures. Although both measures are meant to reassure, both are information-gathering mechanisms set up between international actors who are in pursuit of managing relationships. Many States would refute to go in line with TCBMs due to strong ideological differences, due to pursuit of an arms competition that threatens to go out of hands. By virtue of the fact that, outer space activities are carried most especially by those developed nations, which are the minority, agreement over TCMBs becomes difficult. This is attributable to the fact that, these measures are non-binding and based on good will. They also depend on exchange of information and invitation of observers during the outer space exercises where the measures are based on a cooperative dimensions (Preston, p. 47).

Majority of countries do not agree with them, as there are no sanctions enacted if a state stops to follow them. This is the reason why TCMBs revolves around a political context. Whilst TCMBs are based on the agreements, it becomes hard for many if not all countries accepting them as only few have the ability to exercise outer space activities. What seem to take charge are the verifications measures. They are provisions in a legal treaty and they are binding. In actual sense, verification measures are non-cooperative in nature, there are penalties for violation, and a state can denounce the treaty in such a case. Ronald Reagan (p. 204) argues that TCMBs are based on trust whereas verifications are based on distrust. The countries find it difficult to agree strongly on legal definitions of space weapon. They refute strongly to a treaty and this makes Transparency and Confidence Building Measures an option B.

Earth-to Space and Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons

There will be no great power war in this 21st century than the bursting of kinetic energy and flashing of laser light in the quietness of outer space. Anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and the ballistic missiles are exercised by the developed nations such as USA and China. Before examining and analyzing the case of policy direction, it is of great importance to define space weapons and the period under assessment, scrutinize the political environment surrounding weapons in space, and comprehend existing legal constraints (Logsdon, p. 34).

For the purpose of this paper, space weapon refers to any system or machine placed on earth’s orbit, celestial body such as the moon or deep space with the ability to directly engage, defeating or destroying a target either kinetically or by use of energy. What exactly this definition does not include are weapons that use space as a means to getting from one point on land or air battle space to another, originate from the air, or land medium without any intention of returning. It is from this fact; the definition eliminates International Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), interceptor missiles, Anti Satellite Missiles (ASAT) and earth based energy weapons (Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, and International Trade).

It is worth nothing the mission of Anti Satellite Weapons. The prime mission of these weapons is to destroy crucial components of an enemy network for gathering of intelligence for the command and control the enemy’s own forces and this would only bring conflicts in policies building. ASATs plays a corresponding role whilst enhancing a nations military capability and thereby its ability to dissuade attack. The only fear of an ASAT attack on vital satellites could contribute to the escalation of a crisis or low-level conflict. Policies should consider an evaluation of ASATs on how they would affect the fragile balance of contradictory targets of a war (Edward and Streland, p. 23).

During the UNIDIR conference, the concept of space weapons was dealt at length. It is used to refer to a variety of theoretical weapons systems with a range of capabilities. One of the categories of space weapons is the Earth-to Space weapons. This are weapons based on Earth aimed with targets on space such as the already tested and proven anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles (Spacy 43).

These weapons achieve the desired effects through explosion of kinetic energy. They are the hit and kill weapons that use direct contact with a target in order to impose damage. Both the Chinese and the USA anti-satellite tests were based purely on this kinetic energy approach (James and Spencer, p. 32). It should be noted that outer space is vacuumed in nature. This means that there is no atmosphere in space and as a result, explosives by the anti-satellite weapons do not create shock waves. In view of this, anti-satellite weapons are associated with many problems (Stares, p. 304). The pellets or fragments included in the space weapon in order to hit the target after they are detonated create considerable damage to space assets.

Policies governing Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT), Ballistic Missiles and conflict that arises from them

The idea behind the policies is to govern the resources of the outer space so that they can be used for many generations to come. The question is not whether there will ever be weapons in space, but should they be developed, designed and deployed in a time span the today’s national and international security policy would reasonably manage and govern them. Policies are geared towards enhancing sustainability of the outer space resources. These policies are developed in an intelligent way in order to deal with the most likely sources of conflict. Conflict in policies is brought by congestion, allocation of orbits and the formation of minor debris (Grier, p. 27). A much more complicated set of issues is how to manage the likely foreseeable conflict over the military utility of space.

There are environmental policies and issues that threaten the sustainable use of outer space and the strategic issues that can cause instability and worsen conflict on the ground. The point here is that failure in managing security problems will likely result in an environmental disaster in the outer space and the reverse is true. Space operations and activities could become too threatening or too costly because of the threats and use of ASAT weapons (Karas, p. 36). If the evolution of future administration is not well managed whilst satellites are seen as legitimate targets and outer space is cluttered with debris, outer space will become less and less useful rather than becoming more and more useful (Durch, p. 38).

The destructive ASAT weapon testing that is done signifies not only that these weapons exist, but also generates debris that increases the risk of accidentally disabling a satellite. Policies that allow a mixture of arms control measures and transparency confidence-building measures will give up the greatest amount of collective security as well as preserving the many benefits of the outer space for long period. Policies should address the dangerous amounts of debris that arise from the testing and use of destructive ASAT weapons whose effects can be felt for many generations depending on the altitude of the target.

Indeed, the problem of whether a policy should pursue placing kinetic based weapons capable of directly engaging targets, is to a large extent one that must and be based on sound judgment and take into considerations the consequences. It is to the believe of many people that international policies, agreements or treaties disallows use of weapons of space, but the truth of the matter these agreements limiting weapons in outer space only address weapons of mass destruction (White, p. 17).

Most of the international community is on record in favor of preserving space as a weapons free environment. To state clearly, on November 29, 2001, the United Nations General Assembly voted 156-0 to establish the basis for a treaty to ban space-based weapons. These agreements were not binding and among the major powers in the world only the US and Israel refrained from them. Several scientific groups are for the policies that calls for peaceful exploration and the continuation of the current weapons free environments in space (Karas, p. 103). Many peace organizations and groups are actively opposed to space weapons. Majority of these agreements and policies are in opposition with other land and or environment agreements and policies. For example, they oppose the Kyoto Treaty on the environment, oppose the ban of landmines, and oppose the International Criminal Court and the decision to go to war with some Asian countries. These policies are unilateral in nature instead being based on a multilateral dimension where other policies are taken into consideration (Johnson, p. 44).

The policies should be drafted in agreement with the international community as the consequences are felt world over (Washington University, Space Policy Institute, p. 86). Some factors must be considered especially by the super powers in devising polices such as political influences, international picture, and the possibility of creating a new and costly arms race (Ritchie, p. 203). This will be in the bid to prevent conflict with other environment protection and space security policies. Despite the fact that use of weapons of space could lead to life threatening consequences, there are just few legal limitations and treaties governing it (Freese, p. 36). All together, these treaties only limit a space-based weapon if it consists of a weapon of mass destruction. The policies are set in agreements by countries of the world but most superpowers such as USA withdraws from them, as they are not in line with their interests.

The treaties and policies do not prohibit the development and deployment of space weapons but affects the legality of using the weapons against the other nation’s space systems. Concerning space weapons, the policies do not specifically prevent or limit use of weapons in space though do not specifically direct it (Stares, p. 20).

Alternatives to Solving Conflicts

In cases of conflicts, there are always better alternatives and ways to strike a balance. More particular to state is that, polices should encompass all the states with the capability of using space weapons as these are the leaders (Possel, p. 82). However, this does not exclude other states. More so, the global community feels the developing ones as the effects of weaponizing space. Space policies should be implemented with the goal of actively preventing the space weapons while at the same time assertively funding programs that reduce the vulnerabilities of existing commercial and military space systems (Marquez, p. 98).

Satellite should largely be part of the redundant systems (Stine, p. 122). Countries such as Russia and United States of America with vast resources should take responsibility to provide backup capabilities for the most vital satellite functions and can distribute satellite function over a number of smaller satellites and as a result render them less valuable (Oberg, p. 64).

Policies should be employed to counter ASAT weapons usage in outer space. Destructive weapons should be prohibited from usage in space. Agreements should be put in place and followed to the letter due to the value attached to them. It is critical that those with the capability to use space weapons abandon such programs. These are nations such as Russia and United States of America. Destructive ASAT weapon should be banned as a greater significance and helpfulness as part of the regime or arms control measures (Grossman, p. 54).

It should be noted that, the first step in leadership is setting the projected standard. This is because, space weapons require vast amounts of diverse resources such as financial, intellectual amongst others and only the developed nations such as US and Russia have the ability to do so. By setting the intended standard, the super powers may devise ways to make sure it happens (Jimerson, p. 65). They should stage an international effort to limit space weapons as majority of other nations would presumably give up on space weapons. Since those less developed nations have no prospects for a space program, they are in real sense not giving up something tangible. By establishing and renouncing space weapons, the developed nations are giving up something real and substantial (Peebles). This drive can have the effect of setting a very high international importance on preserving space as a weapons free atmosphere (Hays, p. 39).

Certifiable international conventions that would limit weapons in space are much more than necessary in the light of the growing technology. It is worth to note that, this could only be effective if first the superpowers such as US could set and proclaim a strategy of independent and unilateral constraints especially in the development and deployment of weapons in space (Pike, p. 19). In fact, space weapons are a matter of choice (Moltz, p. 112). If the developed nations through international leadership and dominance in space technology place great emphasis on creating a sanctuary in space thus rendering it peaceful, it would only increase international pressure for other nations to follow suit. This would also set the consequences of any nation’s violating space sanctuary or demonstrable unwillingness to participate in the treaties (Hitchens, p. 85).

Barriers to entry in the space sanctuary should also be put in place. This can only start with the pioneers of space weapons. This would reduce the cost of either entry to space atmosphere economically or politically (Peebles 24). In fact restraining usage of the space for weapons by the super powers will only increase pressure for other nations with the interest to use space weapons to restrain as well. This follows that, any space capable nation failing to restraint and comply with the treaties set in joint cooperation by the super powers and later develops space weapons, would only encourage the super powers to counter any threat including the likelihood of having backing partners in the process (Flynn, p. 60).

Vulnerabilities of current space systems and the sole reliance on them due to matters of force enhancement should be reduced if not diminished. In fact, there are many alternative platforms. Such platforms include the near space balloons that can provide battle space categorization, exploration, and communication and thus reduce Global Positioning System (Stine 45). It should be noted that, military use of space is necessary and on the other hand protecting the space is critical. However, the argument that the military uses space assets to enhance capabilities on the land, sea, and air per se is not justified (Jimerson, p. 29).

Policies should be directed to protect the fragile space systems by being used as weapon grounds. Policies should address threats posed by ballistic missiles defense. In all circumstances, ASAT weapons are associated with the destruction of vital satellite that can lead to mass destruction. The above discussed policies and guidelines would largely bring forth hot debate on matters regarding the usage of the outer space as a platform for use of military weapons.

The said policies would work in agreement among the world states. It should be noted however that, only few nations called the developed states have the ability to launch outer space ASAT weapons. The less developed nations are affected by the consequences of ASAT usage. Majority states will confer with the discussed policies as they revolve around the super powers. If those nations with the ability and technological knowhow of usage of outer space were involved in policies building, it then follows that majority of the policies would be followed by other nations. This does not entirely mean that all policies would be followed to the letter. It is not the case as majority of the developed nations has differing interests in the usage of space and one would like to outdo the other and control outer space atmosphere (Hays and Karl , p. 67).

Works Cited

1. Baker, David, The Shape Of Wars To Come, New York, New York Press, 1982. Print
2. Belote, Howard D. The Weaponization of Space: It Doesn’t Happen in a Vacuum, Airpower Journal,14, 1 (2000). 90.
3. Bunn, George and John, Rhinelander. Outer Space Treaty May Ban Strike Weapons, Arms Control Today, 32, 5 (2002):24. Print.
4. Burke, John, Connections, Boston, Brown and Company Press, 1978. Print
5. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Outer Space.
6. Durch, William J. National interests and the Military Use of Space, Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984. Print.
7. Edward Greer and Streland, Arnold 1999, Clausewitz on Space: Developing Military Space Theory through a Comparative Analysis, Air Command and Staff College. Web.
8. Flynn, Nancy, War in Space, New York: Exter Books, 1986. Print.
9. Freese, Joan, 2000, The Viability of US Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Policy: Moving Toward Space Control, United States Air Force Occasional Paper.
10. Garwin, Richard. Militalization of space, Washington DC: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1982. Print.
11. Garwin, Richard, 1999, Toward International Security: The Development of Space Weapons, ASAT Testing, and National Missile Defense.
12. Grier, Peter, 2001, The New Nuclear ‘Theology’, Christian Science Monitor.
13. Grossman, Karl. Astro-Imperialism: War in Space, Earth Island Journal, 15, 1 (2000): 40. Print.
14. Hays, Peter, 2002, United States Military Space Into the Twenty First Century, United States Air Force Academy, Institute for National Security Studies (Occasional Paper no. 42) pp. 85–88.
15. Hays, Peter and Karl, Mueller, Going Boldly—Where? Airpower Journal, 1 (2001): 56. Print.
16. Hitchens, Theresa, Rushing to Weaponize the Final Frontier, Arms Control Today, 31, 7 (2001): 78. Print.
17. James Cashin and Spencer, Jeffery 1998, Space and Air Force: Rhetoric or Reality?, Air Command and Staff College. Web.
18. Jimerson, Rebecca. North Korea: Locked in a Space Race with the World, in Rebecca Jimerson d Ray A. Williamson (eds.), Space and Military Power in East Asia, Washington DC: George, 2000. Print.
19. Johnson, Rebecca, 2001, Multilateral Approaches to Preventing the Weaponization of Space, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue 56.
20. Karas, T. The New High Ground, New York: Simon and Schuster Press, 1983. Print.
21. Laura Grego, and Wright, David 2002, Anti-Satellite Capabilities of Planned US Missile Defence Systems, Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 68.
22. Logsdon, John. Just Say Wait to Space Power, Issues in Science and Technology, 17, 3 (2001), 33. Print.
23. Lupton, D. On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1988. Print.
24. Marquez, Peter, South Korea: A Space Power by Proxy, in Rebecca Jimerson and Ray A. Williamson (eds.), Space and Military Power in East Asia. Washington DC: George Washington University, Space Policy Institute, 2000. Print.
25. Moltz, James. Breaking the Deadlock on Space Arms Control, Arms Control Today, 32, 3 (2002), 47. Print.
26. Oberg, James 1998, Space Power Theory, United States Air Force. Outlines Oberg’s theory of military space power (that is it inseparable from all forms of terrestrial power) and implications for the American military and government.
27. Peebles, Curtis, Battle for Space, New York: Beaufort Books Inc., 1983. Print.
28. Pike, John, 1998, American Control of Outer Space in the Third Millennium, Web.
29. Possel, William F., 1998, Lasers and Missile Defense: New Concepts for Space-based and Ground based Laser Weapons, Maxwell Air Force Base, Center for Strategy and Technology.
30. Preston, Bob, 2002, Space Weapons Earth Wars, Project Air Force, RAND.
31. Primack, Joel, Pelted by paint, downed by debris, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 58, 5 (2002), 24–25. Print.
32. Ritchie, David. Spacewar. New York: Antheneum Press, 1982. Print.
33. Stares, Paul B. The Militarization of Space, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985. Print.
34. Stares, Paul B, Space and National Security. Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1987. Print.
35. Smith, Bob. The Challenge of Space Power, Airpower Journal, 13, 1 (1999) 34– 35. Print.
36. Spacy, William. 1999, Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons?, Maxwell Air Force Base.
37. Stine, Harry G. Confrontation in Space, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1981. Print.
38. Washington University, Space Policy Institute.
39. White, Robert, 2001, Preserving Space for Peaceful Use: A Case for a New Space Treaty, Auckland, New Zealand, Centre for Peace Studies (Working Paper no. 10).
40. Wilson, Tom, 1998, Threats to U.S. space capabilities. Web.