The SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) was a USSR-US arms control policy that regulated the production and use of nuclear weapons between the two countries. The strategy employed here had several stringent conditions that put hard constraints in the implementation. There had to be the confidence limit measures which were to give each party an assurance that none was ready to take actions enabling it to launch massive attacks. So there has to be a prior notification for the entire missile launching so as to avoid causing gratuitous military vigilance. There was also the issue of the allocation of designated locations where each party’s space systems would be launched such that no other objects would find intrusion.
These were called the keep-out zones. The other issue was the establishment of integrated positions for arms and the development of conceptual strategies in the defense. The other issue was the mutually assured destruction: the employment of nuclear weapons by two rivals and results in the demolition of the attacker and the attacked. The USSR and the US had to take steps to avoid their worst outcomes by threatening their enemies not to employ the use of the very weapons. This had to be employed so as to take care of catastrophic effects in case of conflict breakouts.
The second-strike ability policy had limitations in that mutual destruction is not guaranteed in cases where the first strike is not capable of eliminating a second strike for the enemy. A nation will lose if it is not capable of preempting a second strike of the opponent. The idea of perfect detection to identify the errors in the launch of either side’s armory was had constraints in that it failed. Then a complete nuclear explosion would take place. This is called the false positive criteria in that it checked for errors that occurred when launching arsenal. The assumption of full tracking is not easily realizable. The missile crisis brought about by the long-range delivery of missiles does not enable detection and denotation of far ahead arms. The perfect attribution would result in the ambiguity of identifying from which country a nuclear weapon was unleashed. In case of a launch outside the Russian Borders, no nation would be held responsible.