At many stages, events on the battlefield might have gone differently. Historians stress different moments when the Confederacy was either unlucky or missed opportunities. Confederate forces might have been more pro-active after First Manassas. The Trent Affair could have brought Britain into the war on the Confederate side. Had Stonewall Jackson been up to par in June-July 1862 Lee might have triumphed even more spectacularly in the Seven Days battles. Who knows what would have happened had Lee’s battle orders not fallen into Union hands in Maryland in September 1862?
At many stages, events on the battlefield might have gone differently. Historians stress different moments when the Confederacy was either unlucky or missed opportunities. Confederate forces might have been more pro-active after First Manassas. The Trent Affair could have brought Britain into the war on the Confederate side. Had Stonewall Jackson been up to par in June-July 1862 Lee might have triumphed even more spectacularly in the Seven Days battles. Who knows what would have happened had Lee’s battle orders not fallen into Union hands in Maryland in September 1862?
The Confederacy had its chances in 1863. Given more inspired generalship, Grant might have failed to capture Vicksburg. Lee might have done better at Gettysburg, especially if Stonewall Jackson had not been killed at Chancellorsville. There were still good opportunities for the Confederacy in 1864. Lincoln’s reelection in November 1864 very much depended on (belated) military success. The alternative was a victory for the Democrat party, parts of which were committed to peace. Perhaps President Davis might have taken up General Cleburne’s proposal to redress the South’s manpower shortage by conscripting slaves. In short, the Confederacy was not inevitably a ‘Lost Cause’.
The Confederacy had its chances in 1863. Given more inspired generalship, Grant might have failed to capture Vicksburg. Lee might have done better at Gettysburg, especially if Stonewall Jackson had not been killed at Chancellorsville. There were still good opportunities for the Confederacy in 1864. Lincoln’s reelection in November 1864 very much depended on (belated) military success. The alternative was a victory for the Democrat party, parts οf which were committed to peace. Perhaps President Davis might have taken up General Cleburne’s proposal to redress the South’s manpower shortage by conscripting slaves. In short, the Confederacy was not inevitably a ‘Lost Cause’.
Superior leadership is often seen as the main reason for Union victory. However, in many respects, the Confederacy was well led. While President Lincoln’s superiority to Jefferson Davis might seem self-evident, Lee could think οf no one in the South who could have done a better job than Davis. Davis certainly worked hard and did his best to inspire Southerners. The Confederate government is often charged with failing to efficiently manage the country’s economy and finance.
The main criticism is that it printed too much money, thus fuelling inflation which ravaged the economy and lowered Southern morale. However, given the Union blockade, inflation was inevitable. Despite its economic problems, the Confederacy maintained over 3 per cent οf its population under arms — a higher figure than the North. In terms οf the management οf military supply, the Confederacy could boast some organizational successes. Ordnance Chief Josiah Gorgas, for example, built an arms industry virtually from scratch and kept Confederate armies better supplied than had seemed possible in 1861. The main problem was the shortage — not the management — οf resources.
The key aspect οf leadership in the Civil War, as in any war, was military leadership.
Many historians claim that Davis and Lee, Davis’s most important military adviser and field commander, pursued a flawed military strategy. Davis chose to pursue what has been labeled an ‘offensive-defensive’ strategy. This consisted οf placing conventional armies in an essentially defensive posture to protect as much territory as possible, and launching offensive movements when circumstances seemed promising. Lee emphasized the ‘offensive’ in ‘offensive-defensive’, seeking to find ways to gain and hold the initiative.
His penchant for attack has been particularly criticized. Arguably a more defensive strategy would have conserved manpower, thereby enabling the Confederacy to prolong the war and perhaps exhaust Union will. Historians Grade McWhiney and Perry Jamieson argue that Lee’s offensive strategy extracted a hideous price in battlefield casualties: the South literally bled itself to death in the first three years οf the war. Emory Thomas claims that Lee learned the wrong lessons from General Scott’s successful offensive strategy in the Mexican War. Thomas thinks Lee admired ‘Scott’s bold strategy and probably developed a confidence in attacking that made him miscalculate against an enemy well led and armed with rifles instead οf much shorter-range muskets’.
However, it is unlikely that a purely defensive strategy would have succeeded. General Joe Johnston was the Confederate exponent οf defensive warfare. Refusing to stand and fight, he surrendered huge chunks οf land virtually without a struggle in north Virginia in 1862 and in Georgia in 1864. This did not enhance Southern morale. Moreover, Confederate retreat often led to disastrous sieges and huge surrenders, for example Fort Donelson (1862) and Vicksburg (1863).
Lee’s battles in 1862-3 were certainly costly: from Seven Days to Chancellorsville his casualties were 65,000 (οf whom 10,000 died). But this effusion οf blood served a purpose. The key to success lay in winning victories that depressed Union and bolstered Confederate morale. Victories might also convince Britain and France to recognize the Confederacy. Lee, like all Civil War generals, recognized the advantage οf fighting on the defensive. But he also knew that a purely defensive strategy would result in the Confederacy being picked off at will.
The only hope in Lee’s view (and surely he was right) was to retain the initiative and risk attack, hoping for a great Waterloo-type victory. As Prussia was to prove in the Seven Weeks War against Austria (1866) and in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1), spectacular offensive victories could be won — despite the rifle-musket. On several occasions Lee’s strategy almost won him an annihilating victory. When finally forced on the defensive in 1864-5, he had to fight the kind οf war the Confederacy could not win.